ARE LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNORS HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE? SUBNATIONAL ECONOMIC VOTING IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND VENEZUELA.

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Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago IL, April 3-6, 2003.
AUTHOR'S NOTE

This research is based on work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant SES-0096695 and the Latin American and Iberian Institute of the University of New Mexico.
Most accounts of economic voting explore the relationship between economic performance and incumbent support at the national level of government. The usual argument rests on the assumption that citizens assign responsibility for economic management to the central governments and punish or reward elected officials accordingly. Yet, in federal regimes, where governors play an active role in regional economic development and often influence, either directly or indirectly, the central government’s economic decisions and policy performance, it is not clear which level of government will be rewarded (blamed) for good (poor) economic performance. In federal regimes, the extent to which citizens are able to differentiate between economic jurisdictions when assigning responsibility for economic performance remains uncertain.

On the one hand, citizens may be able to separate economic policy jurisdictions very effectively. Accordingly, citizens may hold governors responsible for state-level economic performance, just as they hold the president responsible for national-level performance. On the other hand, however, citizens may be confused about economic policy jurisdictions. As a result, citizens may fail to recognize the role played by governors in state-level economic affairs. Confused citizens may also blame and reward governors for the president’s policy choices.

These issues raise vital questions for the study of governmental accountability, especially in regions of the world that have recently undergone important processes of administrative decentralization. If voters fail to reward and punish governors for state-level
economic performance, democratic accountability is likely to be highly attenuated. Presumably, decentralization brings more government accountability and a more efficient provision of public services. However, if citizens are not able to attribute responsibility for economic performance to the correct level of government, decentralization may not generate the expected improvements. On the contrary, it may create disincentives for local governments to manage the economy responsibly.

This paper explores subnational economic voting in Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela on the basis of individual-level data. Consistent with prior research, the analysis suggests that individual gubernatorial approval is shaped by the performance of the incumbent presidential administration. At the same time, the analysis also demonstrates that citizens respond to the policy performance of subnational governments when evaluating governors. However, the analysis suggests that the extent to which subnational officials are held accountable for provincial/state economic performance varies along the degree of centralization of the different federal arrangements.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Can individuals differentiate subnational economic policy jurisdictions from national ones when assigning responsibility for past economic performance? Are governors evaluated on the basis of the national and/or subnational economic performance? Do individual voters evaluate governors on the basis of the president’s performance at the national level? Do citizens simply fail to recognize the role played by governors in economic policy-making?

These questions have been explored extensively in the U.S. context and have yielded an ongoing debate opposing two central views about the nexus between economic performance and incumbent support at the subnational level of government. The first view
posits that governors are evaluated on the basis of the president’s performance (Carsey and Wright 1998; Piereson 1975; Simon 1989; Simon, Ostrom and Marra 1991). The expectation is that voters use subnational elections to signal their displeasure with the president. If voters are satisfied with the president’s performance, subnational politicians from the president’s party will be rewarded. Conversely, if voters are unhappy about the president, subnational office holders will be punished. Another version of the referendum voting model posits that in-party governors are blamed and rewarded for national economic performance (Stein 1990). Along this line, “incumbents of the president’s party are used by state electorates to send a message to the president about the economic condition in the states and regions” (from Atkeson and Partin 1995: p. 106).

The referendum voting model assumes that individual voters do not acknowledge the governors’ independent economic policy inputs. According to this model, presidents are central political figures, around which both national and subnational politics revolve. The fundamental logic of the referendum model implies that individual voters send messages to the central government when evaluating the performance of governors.

The opposing view to the referendum model builds on the premise that “the responsibility of managing the state economy is laid at the feet of the governor” (Atkeson and Partin 1995: p.100), and suggests that governors are evaluated on basis of state-level rather than national-level economic performance (Atkeson and Partin 1995; Howell and Vanderleeuv 1990; Leyden and Borrelli 1995; Niemi, Stanley and Vogel 1995; Partin 1995; Svoboda 1995). Drawing upon theories of retrospective voting (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981; Key 1966), this view implies that individuals punish incumbent governors for deteriorating state economic conditions and reward them for improving state conditions.
The retrospective approach assumes that voters recognize the independent policy-making role played by governors. In the U.S. context, subnational governments adopt administrative behaviors that are believed to affect the states’ economic conditions. “Increasingly, states are actively recruiting businesses to their communities through tax incentives, inexpensive land, and cheaper living conditions for their employees” (Atkeson and Partin 1995: p.100). The retrospective voting model also assumes that governors are central figures in state politics. The approach recognizes that, just like presidents, governors are visible “targets of discontent” (Kirschten 1990). Evidence from the U.S. has shown that the governor is the second most recognized elected official, behind the president (Hinckley, Hofstetter, and Kessel 1974; Squire and Fastnow 1994).

Subnational politics in Latin America

Latin American governors are no different than U.S. governors in that they also enjoy significant economic policy-making powers and responsibilities. Indeed, recent processes of administrative decentralization in the region have transferred increased decision-making powers to subnational governments, making them central actors in the management of economic affairs (Inter-American Development Bank 1997). The constitution of 1988 gave Brazil a more fiscally decentralized federalism by going as far as allowing state banks to issue currency to finance state spending (Montero 2000: p. 67). Similarly, the 1994 reform of the Argentine constitution increased the autonomy of the provinces by limiting the president’s discretionary power in distributing federal funds (Jones 1997: p. 294). Venezuela followed a similar trend by allowing the democratic election of governors for the first time in

1 Many items of the reform were revisited in the aftermath of the currency crisis of 1999.
1989, although fiscal decentralization has not progressed as far as in the other countries and has recently suffered important setbacks.\(^2\)

The increased role played by subnational governments in state-level economic affairs has been paralleled by their mounting influence in national economic policy-making. Recent events in Argentina and Brazil have demonstrated that governors’ collaboration with the central government is essential to ensure national economic stability. Over the past years, the Argentine central government has had to renegotiate its fiscal pact with the provinces several times in order to satisfy the international financial institutions’ conditions for granting the country emergency stabilization packages (The Economist Oct. 21\(^{st}\) 1999, Nov. 15\(^{th}\) 2001, May 2\(^{nd}\) 2002). The Brazilian central government had to enter into similar negotiations with the state governors to restore national economic stability and growth in the wake of its 1999 currency crisis (Montero 2000: p. 51).

In addition to their national and subnational policy influence, Latin American governors, just like their U.S. counterparts, also enjoy a high degree of public visibility. In Latin America, it is not rare to see governors use their office to propel their career to higher grounds. Governors often become presidential candidates, and even presidents, as in the case of Carlos Menem and Eduardo Duhalde of Argentina, Fernando Collor and Itamar Franco of Brazil, and Henrique Salas Romer of Venezuela.

At the same time, and despite the recent decentralizing trends, economic policymaking in Latin America remains highly centralized in the hands of the national executive (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). Especially in times of economic crisis, the role played by

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\(^2\) Recent constitutional reforms in Venezuela have contributed to centralize the federal arrangement. “The new constitution maintained the federal structure of elected governors and mayors, but it created a Federal Council to determine the distribution of national resources to the states and municipalities and further restricted the revenue-raising authority of these entities” (McCoy 2000: p.69).
presidents in implementing stabilization and adjustment efforts may overshadow the independent role played by governors in economic policy-making. Governors may be seen simply as local managers working for the central government, and may be evaluated on the basis of the president’s performance, as suggested by the referendum voting model.

HYPOTHESES

The role governors play in state and national economic management combined to their high level of public visibility suggest that governors should be held accountable for state/provincial economic performance, especially in the more decentralized federal regimes such as Argentina and Brazil. Hence, the first hypothesis (H1) proposes that individual evaluations of the state/province economic situation vary positively with evaluations of incumbent governors. Consistent with the retrospective voting tradition, the expectations are that individuals with positive assessments of the economic performance of their state/province are more likely to approve of the incumbent governor. Conversely, negative assessments should decrease the individual likelihood of approving of the governor.

However, the central role played by presidents in economic policy-making and their very high level of visibility suggest a set of rival hypotheses, especially in more centralized federal regimes such as in Venezuela. Hence, the second and third hypotheses suggest that individual evaluations of governors vary positively (H2) with evaluations of the president and (H3) with evaluations of the national economic situation. In both instances, the expectation is that citizens with positive assessments of the president’s performance measured either by presidential approval (H2) or by policy outcomes associated with the president’s office (H3), will have a greater probability of approving of in-party governors.
Conversely, individuals with negative assessments of the president’s performance will have a lesser probability of approving of in-party governors.

DATA AND MODEL

The hypotheses are explored on the basis of survey data collected by three public opinion research firms located in Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela: Mori-Argentina (Buenos Aires, Argentina), Datafolha (Sao Paolo, Brazil) and Penquest (Valencia, Venezuela). Each survey was conducted on a representative sample of the population of each province/state through face-to-face interviews. The Argentine surveys were completed in 1998 and averaged 517 respondents (see Table 5.1 – located on page 19). The Brazilian surveys were conducted in 1997 and averaged 1295 respondents. The two Venezuelan surveys were conducted in 2000 (September and December) and had sample sizes of 1008 and 1018, respectively.

Six Argentine provinces (out of 24), 11 Brazilian states (out of 27), and one Venezuelan state (out of 23) are included in the analysis. In the Venezuelan case, two surveys conducted at different times in the same state are included to improve the reliability of the analysis. As table 5.1 indicates, the Argentine provinces included in the analysis represent about 65 percent of the country’s total population and 55 percent of its GDP. Similarly, the Brazilian states represent over 75 percent of Brazil’s total population and about 86 percent of the country’s GDP. The one state included in the Venezuelan analysis only represents 8 percent of the country’s population. Although the capital of the state of Carabobo is the second most active industrial center after Caracas, the country’s capital, and therefore very important, there is an obvious need to be cautious in drawing inferences on the basis of a single and potentially unrepresentative state.
Despite their limitations, the assembled data set offers enough variation in economic and political conditions across subnational units to provide a robust test of the hypotheses in Argentina and Brazil. As shown in Table 5.1, subnational economic performance varies from one province/state to another. In both Argentina and Brazil, available unemployment data indicate that some provinces/states fare much better than others, and that regional economic performance differs from national performance. In addition, the data set provides enough cases where the incumbent governor is not from the president’s party. This is especially important to test the referendum voting hypothesis. Unfortunately, only one Venezuelan province could be included in the analysis. Although the analysis for this country is not as robust as for Argentina it offers some preliminary basis for discussion in that country and extends the comparative reach of the analysis.

In addition to variations across the subnational units selected for the analysis, there are important differences with respect to the three federal regimes. As observed earlier, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela all initiated processes of political and economic decentralization during the 1980s and 1990s. However, the extent to which these processes have led to the effective decentralization of their federal regime varies from one country to another, especially in term of financial decentralization. Figure 5.1 (located on page 20) indicates that Venezuela is the most financially centralized, with the subnational governments responsible for only about 20 percent of total government expenditures. Argentina and Brazil are much more decentralized, even when compared to OECD countries. In Argentina and Brazil, subnational government expenditures account for almost 50 percent of total government spending. This variation is of importance with respect to the ability of
citizens to identify which level of government is responsible for economic policy implementation, and may even help explain variations in results across federal regimes.

In order to test the hypotheses the analysis relies on a simple additive model of individual gubernatorial approval. The general model can be resumed as follow:

\[
GOVAP = \beta_1 \text{NATECON} + \beta_2 \text{STATECON} + \beta_3 \text{PRESAP} + \beta_4 \text{PARTID} + \beta_5 \text{INPARTY} + \beta_6 \text{NATECON*INPART} + \beta_7 \text{STATECON*INPARTY} + \beta_8 \text{PRESAP*INPARTY} + \epsilon
\]

where GOVAP is the dependent variable reflecting individual evaluations of the governor. NATECON and STATECON are single variables measuring individual assessments of national and state economic performance, respectively. PRESAP is a single variable measuring individual evaluations of the president’s general performance. PARTID is a dummy variable identifying respondents that identify with the party of the incumbent president. INPARTY is a dummy variable used in interactions with NATECON, STATECON, and PRESAP to compare the impact of these variables on gubernatorial approval in out-party and in-party states/provinces.\(^3\) Finally, \(\epsilon\) is an error term.\(^4\)

The dependent variable included in the model measures individual evaluations of the incumbent governor. In all three countries, the question used in the analysis asked respondents to provide an assessment of the governor’s job performance. In Argentina and Brazil, there were five possible answers, ranging from “very bad” to “very good.” In

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\(^3\) INPARTY and it’s interaction with NATECON, PROVECON, and PRESAP are left out of the Venezuelan analysis because the data set for this country only includes one state. The Venezuelan data set does not allow for the comparison of gubernatorial approval functions in-party and out-party states.

\(^4\) Sociodemographic control variables such as level of education and socioeconomic status were included in prior iterations of the model. They did not affect the level of significance and strength of the other coefficients in any meaningful way, nor did they improve the model. For these reasons, and to ease presentation, they were not included in this iteration of the model.
Venezuela, the question had four possible answers, ranging from “disapprove” to approve” (see Appendix B for precise question wording).

The main independent variables included in the model consist of different individual economic assessments. Unfortunately, the surveys did not include the same questions across countries. In Argentina, two questions were used; one asking respondents to assess the state of the national economy, and another asking them to assess the state of the provincial economy. These questions had five possible answers ranging from “very bad” to “very good”. In the Brazilian surveys, there was no question specifically asking respondents to evaluate the state of the state economy. However, the surveys included questions asking respondents to indicate whether they believed inflation and unemployment would “improve,” “remain the same” or “worsen” in the near future. While inflation can be said to be strictly a national issue, unemployment taps into more local dimensions of economic performance. While inflation imposes direct costs and benefits to the whole population, the consequences of rising unemployment are generally more localized. It is thus easier for individuals to associate fluctuations in unemployment with their local administrator, here the governor. In the Venezuelan surveys, respondents were asked to evaluate the state of the national economy. Unfortunately, no question asked respondents to directly assess the state economy. A question asking respondents about their past personal financial situation is therefore used as a proxy for more localized economic performance. For both questions, there were five possible answers ranging from “much worse” to “much better.” The expectation is that

\[5\] Although these questions directly measure expectations about future trend of the indicators, they are used as proxy for assessments of current/past economic conditions. It is believed that individuals use their assessments of the current/past situation to extrapolate about the future. In Brazil, past, current, and future economic assessments display high levels of correlation.
positive economic assessments increase the likelihood of approving of the incumbent governor.

In addition to these economic assessments, the model accounts for individual evaluations of the incumbent president. In Argentina and Brazil, the question used to measure presidential approval asked respondents to evaluate the performance of the president and included five possible answers ranging from “very bad” to “very good”. In Venezuela the question included four possible answers ranging from “bad” to “good”. This variable should have a positive effect on the probability of approving of the incumbent governor.

Finally, the model includes a control for party preferences. This variable consists in the respondent’s self-declared party identification or preference. In all three countries, the original variable was open-ended, and was recoded into a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the respondent claimed to prefer or be a militant of the governor’s political party, and otherwise zero. This variable is expected to have a positive effect on the likelihood of supporting the incumbent governor.

**DATA ANALYSIS**

The statistical analysis relies on the ordered probit regression method to accommodate the limited range of the dependent variable. Because the datasets are country specific, the results are presented in separate tables for each country. The main objective is not to make direct cross-country comparisons, but rather to evaluate the extent to which incumbent governors are evaluated on the basis of the performance of their state/province (H1) the president’s performance (H2), and/or the national economic performance (H3).
Table 5.2 (located on page 21) presents the results of the analysis for Argentina. The results are presented in four separate models because preliminary analysis of covariance revealed that two pairs of variables were highly correlated. The Pearson’s R statistics for national economic assessments and presidential approval (.55) and for provincial and national economic assessments (.70) are high enough to suggest that their inclusion in the same model could create problems of multicollinearity. To insure that multicollinearity does not bias the coefficients nor affects the reliability of their t-ratios, several combinations of the variables are explored in different models.

The analysis reveals that, when including both provincial and national economic assessments and excluding presidential approval (Model 2), the variable measuring national economic assessments (as well as its interaction with the in-party dummy) fails to reach statistical significance. This suggests that the variable measuring provincial economic assessments is more efficient at predicting gubernatorial approval than national economic assessments. This proposition is confirmed when including provincial (Model 3) and national (Model 4) economic assessments separately, while not excluding presidential approval. A comparison of the Chi-squared statistics for Model 3 (860.75) and Model 4 (1176.69) suggests that the specification of Model 4 is better than that of Model 3. The inclusion of provincial, instead of national, economic assessments improves the overall efficiency of the model.

These results indicate that subnational and national economic assessments are measuring a very similar dimension of economic performance. However, they also suggest that the variable measuring subnational assessments is a more powerful estimator of
gubernatorial approval. Obviously, this creates a problem of interpretation. The high level of correlation between provincial and national economic assessments suggests that Argentine citizens cannot differentiate very clearly provincial economic performance from national economic performance. Hence, it is not clear whether or not to reject the first hypothesis. By suggesting that provincial economic assessments measure aspects of both the national and provincial economic performance, the analysis only brings partial support for the proposition that Argentines evaluate their governor on the basis of their assessment of the province’s economic performance. Along the same line, it is not possible to completely rule out the suggestion that governors are evaluated on the basis of the national economic performance (H3).

The comparison of the coefficients for provincial economic assessments in out-party and in-party provinces reveals that provincial economic assessments have a stronger effect on individual evaluations of in-party governors (Model 4). The coefficient for provincial economic assessments in in-party provinces (.632 - .310 = .322) is almost reduced by half when compared to the coefficient for the same variable in out-party provinces (.632). This suggests that individual citizens attribute more weight to provincial economic performance when their governor is not from the president’s party.

The results presented in Table 5.1 (Model 4) also support the referendum voting hypothesis. The data suggests that individual assessments of the president have a positive impact on gubernatorial approval in-party provinces (.204 + .267 = .471), as proposed by the U.S. literature. However, the analysis also indicates that out-party governors are evaluated on the basis of the president’s performance (.204). This seems to indicate that citizens associate their governor with the president, even if the two officeholders come from different political
parties. In doing so, the results suggest that the referendum model, as applied in Argentina, is not exclusively driven by the politicians’ party affiliation. Rather, governors are seen as local managers, working for the central government. In line with the relationship proposed in the U.S. literature, however, the comparative analysis of the coefficients across provinces indicated that presidential approval has a greater influence over evaluations of the governor in in-party provinces. The coefficient for presidential approval in in-party provinces (.204 + .267 = .471) is more than twice the size of the coefficient found in out-party provinces (.204).

To sum up, the Argentine analysis offers only partial support for the retrospective and referendum hypotheses. However, the comparison of the coefficients in in-party and out-party provinces suggest that citizens appear to evaluate in-party governors more on the basis of the president’s performance and less on the basis of past economic performance. Conversely, citizens appear to evaluate out-party governors more on the basis of past economic performance and less on the basis of the president’s performance.

**Brazil**

Table 5.3 (located on page 22) presents the results of the analysis for Brazil. Unlike in the Argentine case, preliminary analysis of covariance did not reveal any signs of multicollinearity among the independent variables. However, the lack of statistical significance of the inflation variable in Model 1 warrants some further exploration. Contrary to Argentina, the results of the fully specified model reveals no evidence that Brazilian citizens evaluate governors on the basis of the national economic performance (here, assessments about inflation—INFLA). The coefficient for the variable INFLA does not reach statistical significance in either in-party or out-party states, even though inflation is an
important determinant of support for presidents at the national level. To insure that the three
key independent variables are not measuring the same dimension, they are included as pairs
into separate models (Model 2, 3, and 4).

In Model 2, the fact that INFLA gains statistical significance when included along
with UNEMPL confirms the expectation that INFLA AND UNEMPL are measuring
different dimensions of economic performance, with INFLA possibly capturing some
element of the national economic performance and UNEMPL the state performance. In
Model 3, that INFLA loses statistical significant when included with PRESAP provides
evidence that INFLA measures a dimension also captured by presidential approval. Finally,
the comparison of the results obtained in Model 1 and Model 4 confirms that the inclusion of
INFLA does not add any relevant information to the model. Hence, assessments about
inflation are believed to measure a national dimension of economic performance, and have
no effect on gubernatorial approval when controlling for presidential approval.

Although, there is no direct evidence to support the proposition that governors are
evaluated upon the basis of the national economic performance, the results indicate that
governors are evaluated on the basis of individual evaluations of the president. Brazilians
with favorable assessments of the presidents are more likely to support the governor, and
those with negative assessments are less likely to support the governor. As in Argentina, the
impact is positive and statistically significant whether the governor is from the president’s
party (.262 + .046 = .311) or from the opposition (.262). In Brazil, however, the effect is only
slightly stronger for in-party governors, suggesting that governors are perceived by the
citizens as subordinates of the national administration not linked to the president exclusively
through their political party affiliation.
Finally, the results of the Brazilian analysis offer clear support for the retrospective hypothesis (H1). They indicate that governors are held accountable for state-level economic performance. More precisely, positive assessments about unemployment increase the likelihood of approving of the governor. These results are consistent with the expectation that governors have at least some degree of influence over unemployment. Unlike Argentines, however, the state-level economic assessments have similar effects on gubernatorial approval across states, whether the president’s party is in control or not.

**Venezuela**

Table 5.4 (located on page 23) presents the results for Venezuela. Because the dataset only includes surveys conducted in a single state, it is not possible to control for the political party of the governor. Accordingly, only the first two hypotheses can be tested, and no interaction terms are included in the model. Although the inferences that can be drawn from the data are limited, the results nevertheless offer an interesting contrast to those presented for Argentina and Brazil. Contrary to Argentina and Brazil, the results presented in Table 5.4 suggest a rejection of the retrospective economic voting hypothesis. The lack of statistical significance of the coefficients for personal financial (PERSFIN) suggests that individuals do not hold governors accountable for more localized economic performance.

However, the results offer support for the referendum hypothesis, as measured by presidential approval, but not by assessments of the national economy. As in Argentina and Brazil, favorable evaluations of the president have a positive impact on individual support for the governor. The fact that support is found for the referendum voting hypothesis in a state controlled by an opposition party suggests that Venezuelans also perceive the governor as a
local manager working for the central government. These findings are not so surprising when we consider that Venezuela’s federal regime is comparatively more centralized than Argentina or Brazil’s, especially in fiscal matters.

DISCUSSION

The current paper explored the relationship between individual economic assessments and gubernatorial approval on the basis of survey data collected in three countries of Latin America, a region of the world in which important decentralization efforts have been initiated in the recent past. In the two countries where decentralization efforts have been the most consistent, Argentina and Brazil, the analysis found support for the gubernatorial retrospective economic voting hypothesis, as well as for the referendum voting hypothesis. In Venezuela, where the decentralization efforts have been more limited, the analysis only found support for the referendum voting hypothesis. The result of the analysis also suggest that both in-party and out-party governors are evaluated on the basis the president’s performance, albeit to different degrees.

These findings have important implications for the study Latin American subnational politics. The fact that both in-party and out-party governors are found to be evaluated on the basis of the performance of the incumbent president suggests a certain level of citizens’ confusion. Accordingly, out-party governors benefit from the incumbent president’s good performance and are hurt by his/her poor performance, just like in-party governors. Hence, governors have few incentives to efficiently manage the local economy and public service, as they are evaluated on the basis of the president’s performance, and not their own.

However, the fact that governors are also evaluated on the basis of state/provincial economic performance in Argentina and Brazil, but not in the more centralized federal
regime of Venezuela, suggests that political decentralization is associated with increased
democratic accountability. More decentralized regimes thus provide political incentives for
good subnational economic management and public service provision. Governors that
manage the economy well can actually gain electoral benefits from managing their
state/province more efficiently, while those who fail to generate good economic performance
run the risk of losing support.

Hence, the findings of this paper support the argument that gubernatorial approval
reflects a combination of both national and state-level evaluations (Svoboda 1995; King
2001). As in the U.S., the findings suggest that the referendum and retrospective hypotheses
do not have to be treated as rival explanations of subnational incumbent support, but can
actually coexist (Partin 2000).
REFERENCES CITED


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Table 5.1 Subnational economic and political conditions in Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela

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<th>Population % of total</th>
<th>GDP % of total</th>
<th>Unemployment %</th>
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<td>7.71%</td>
<td>4.25%</td>
<td>21.60%</td>
<td>PFL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceara</td>
<td>1132</td>
<td>4.37%</td>
<td>2.02%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>PSDB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>14248</strong></td>
<td><strong>74.52%</strong></td>
<td><strong>86.26%</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carabobo (Sept.)</td>
<td>1008</td>
<td>8.00%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Proyecto Carabobo</td>
<td>MVR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carabobo (Dec.)</td>
<td>1018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2026</strong></td>
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Sources:
Figure 5.1 Governmental decentralization in Latin America, 1995 (in percent)

Table 5.2 Gubernatorial approval regressed on individual economic assessments and presidential approval in Argentina, 1998 (Ordered probit analysis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Model 3</th>
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<tr>
<td>PARTID</td>
<td>.348***</td>
<td>.423***</td>
<td>.397***</td>
<td>.364***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.73)</td>
<td>(13.92)</td>
<td>(6.67)</td>
<td>(6.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATECON</td>
<td>-.119**</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.341***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.18)</td>
<td>(.81)</td>
<td>(7.68)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROVECON</td>
<td>.698***</td>
<td>.637***</td>
<td>.632***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(15.03)</td>
<td>(7.08)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(16.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESAP</td>
<td>.243***</td>
<td>.204***</td>
<td>.204***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.16)</td>
<td>(5.26)</td>
<td>(5.84)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN-PARTY</td>
<td>-.148</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>-.534***</td>
<td>-.174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.04)</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
<td>(-4.09)</td>
<td>(-1.23)</td>
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<td>NATECON*IN-PARTY</td>
<td>-.109</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>-.260***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.59)</td>
<td>(-.02)</td>
<td>(-4.78)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>PROVECON*INPARTY</td>
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<td>-.116**</td>
<td>-.310***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-4.02)</td>
<td>(-1.97)</td>
<td>(-6.54)</td>
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<td>PRESAP*INPARTY</td>
<td>.287***</td>
<td>.335***</td>
<td>.267***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(5.83)</td>
<td>(6.90)</td>
<td>(6.00)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2881</td>
<td>2903</td>
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<td>2884</td>
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<tr>
<td>LR Chi-Squared</td>
<td>1212.78***</td>
<td>855.98***</td>
<td>860.75***</td>
<td>1176.69***</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: T-values in parentheses. * = statistically significant at .1, ** = statistically significant at .05, and *** = statistically significant at .01 or better.
Table 5.3 Gubernatorial approval regressed on individual economic assessments and presidential approval in Brazil, 1997 (Ordered probit analysis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>.355***</td>
<td>.353***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12.10)</td>
<td>(13.93)</td>
<td>(12.36)</td>
<td>912.40</td>
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<td>INFLA</td>
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<td>.085***</td>
<td>.015</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(-.06)</td>
<td>(3.77)</td>
<td>(.69)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEMPL</td>
<td>.090***</td>
<td>.132***</td>
<td></td>
<td>.090***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.67)</td>
<td>(6.94)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(4.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESAP</td>
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<td>.259***</td>
<td>.262***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17.76)</td>
<td>(18.56)</td>
<td>(19.25)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>IN-PARTY</td>
<td>-.071</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>-.082</td>
<td>-.034</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.79)</td>
<td>(-1.13)</td>
<td>(-.51)</td>
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<tr>
<td>INFLA*IN-PARTY</td>
<td>.006</td>
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<td>.005</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(.44)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
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<td>-.007</td>
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<td>(.41)</td>
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<td>(-.28)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRESAP*INPARTY</td>
<td>.056***</td>
<td>.058***</td>
<td>.046**</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(3.08)</td>
<td>(2.51)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>12438</td>
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<tr>
<td>LR Chi-Squared</td>
<td>1267.62***</td>
<td>418.70***</td>
<td>1243.52***</td>
<td>1351.08***</td>
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</table>

Notes: T-values in parentheses. * = statistically significant at .1, ** = statistically significant at .05, and *** = statistically significant at .01 or better.
Table 5.4 Gubernatorial approval regressed on individual economic assessments and presidential approval in Venezuela, 2000 (Ordered probit analysis)

<table>
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<th>Model 2</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>PARTID</td>
<td>.569***</td>
<td>.509***</td>
<td>.558***</td>
<td>614***</td>
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<td>(5.15)</td>
<td>(4.69)</td>
<td>(5.07)</td>
<td>(5.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATECON</td>
<td>-.048</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>-.012</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(-.67)</td>
<td>(.36)</td>
<td>(-.18)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSFIN</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.060*</td>
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<td>(.1.48)</td>
<td>(1.90)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESAP</td>
<td>.101***</td>
<td>.106***</td>
<td>.124***</td>
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<td>(3.38)</td>
<td>(3.56)</td>
<td>(4.66)</td>
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<td>N</td>
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<td>1657</td>
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<td>1952</td>
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<td>36.51***</td>
<td>25.60***</td>
<td>33.78***</td>
<td>53.11***</td>
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</table>

Notes: T-values in parentheses. * = statistically significant at .1, ** = statistically significant at .05, and *** = statistically significant at .01 or better.
ARGENTINA

**Gubernatorial approval**
Como evalúa usted __________ como governador de __________
1. Muy mala
2. Mala
3. Ni Buena ni mala
4. Buena
5. Muy buena
99. No sabe/no responde (recoded as missing)

**Presidential approval**
Como evalúa usted la gestión de Carlos Menem como presidente?
1. Muy mala
2. Mala
3. Ni Buena ni mala
4. Buena
5. Muy buena
99. No sabe/no responde (recoded as missing)

**Provincial economic situation**
Como calificaría usted la situación económica actual de la Provincia de ____?
1. Muy mala
2. Mala
3. Ni Buena ni mala
4. Buena
5. Muy buena
99. No sabe/no responde (recoded as missing)

**National economic situation**
Como calificaría usted la situación económica actual del país?
1. Muy mala
2. Mala
3. Ni Buena ni mala
4. Buena
5. Muy buena
99. No sabe/no responde (recoded as missing)

**Party id**
A cuál partido está afiliado?
Open ended.
BRAZIL

Gubernatorial approval
O governador ______________ está completando dois anos e seis meses de governo. Na sua opinião ele está fazendo um governo:
1. Péssimo
2. Ruim
3. Regular
4. Bom
5. Ótimo
99. Não sabe (recoded as missing)

Presidential approval
O presidente Fernando Henrique Cardoso está completando dois anos e seis meses de governo. Na sua opinião ele está fazendo um governo:
1. Péssimo
2. Ruim
3. Regular
4. Bom
5. Ótimo
99. Não sabe (recoded as missing)

Inflation
Na sua opinião daqui para frente a inflação vai aumentar, diminuir ou ficar como está?
1. Vai aumentar
2. Vai ficar como está
3. Vai diminuir
99. Não sabe (recoded as missing)

Unemployment
O desemprego vai aumentar, diminuir ou ficar como está?
1. Vai aumentar
2. Vai ficar como está
3. Vai diminuir
99. Não sabe (recoded as missing)

Party id
Qual é o seu partido político de preferência?
Open ended.
VENEZUELA

Gubernatorial approval
Como evalúa usted la gestión del Gobernador Henrique Fernando Salas Römer?
1. Desaprueba totalmente
2. Más o menos la desaprueba
3. Más o menos la aprueba
4. Aprueba totalmente
99. No sabe/no responde (recoded as missing)

Presidential approval
Como evalúa usted la gestión del Presidente Hugo Chávez Frías?
1. Desaprueba totalmente
2. Más o menos la desaprueba
3. Más o menos la aprueba
4. Aprueba totalmente
99. No sabe/no responde (recoded as missing)

Personal situation
Y en cuanto a su situación personal y familiar, usted siente que las cosas andan bien o andan mal?
1. Mal
2. Regular para mal
3. Regular para bien
4. Bien
99. No sabe/no responde (recoded as missing)

National situation
Sobre la situación actual del país, cómo siente usted siente que marchan las cosas? Usted siente que las cosas andan por buen camino o andan por mal camino?
1. Mal camino
2. Buen camino
99. No sabe/no responde (recoded as missing)

Party id
Independientemente de su intención de voto, por cuál partido político o movimiento de electores siente usted mayores simpatías?
Open ended.